OCS Report MMS 2000-021

Incidents Associated with Oil and Gas Operations Outer Continental Shelf 1998

U.S. Department of the Interior Minerals Management Service Engineering and Operations Division

OCS Report MMS 2000-021

Incidents Associated with Oil and Gas Operations Outer Continental Shelf 1998

Authors: Data Collected By District Personnel Database Managed By Regional and District Personnel Publication Compiled By L. John Chadwell Cheryl Blundon Cheryl Anderson Mariella Cacho

This report can also be obtained on MMS’s homepage at http://www.mms.gov

U.S. Department of the Interior Minerals Management Service Herndon, VA Engineering and Operations Division 2000

Contents Abbreviations and Acronyms ..................................................................................................... v

Foreword ................................................................................................................................. vii

Executive Summary .................................................................................................................. ix

Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1 I. Authority ............................................................................................................ 1 II. Importance and Relation to Other Aspects of Safety Program ............................. 1 III. Accident Reporting Requirements and Policies ................................................... 1 IV. General Incident Trends...................................................................................... 2

Gulf of Mexico Region Blowouts 1998 ............................................................................................................... 5 Fatalities 1998 .............................................................................................................. 10 Collisions 1998 ............................................................................................................ 15 Explosions 1998 ........................................................................................................... 18 Fires 1998 .................................................................................................................... 20 Injuries 1998 ................................................................................................................ 52 Significant Pollution Events (>50bbl) 1998 .................................................................. 71 Pipeline Events 1998 .................................................................................................... 73

Pacific Region Blowouts 1998 ............................................................................................................. 74 Fires 1998 .................................................................................................................... 75 Injuries 1998 ................................................................................................................ 76 Other Events 1998........................................................................................................ 77

OCS Events by Category: 1995 – 1999 .................................................................................... 79

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Appendix – Graphical Summary of OCS Incident Data – 1998

Causes of Blowouts on OCS 1998 .............................................................................. A-1 Causes of Collisions on OCS 1998 ............................................................................. A-2 Causes of Explosions on OCS 1998............................................................................ A-3 Causes of Fatalities on OCS 1998............................................................................... A-4 Causes of Fires on OCS 1998 ..................................................................................... A-5 Causes of Injuries on OCS 1998 ................................................................................. A-6 Causes of Significant Pollution Events on OCS in 1998 ............................................. A-7 Causes of Pipeline Events on OCS 1998..................................................................... A-8 Type of Activity for Blowouts on OCS 1998.............................................................. A-9 Activity During Explosions on OCS 1998 ................................................................ A-10 Activity During Fatalities on OCS 1998 ................................................................... A-11 Activity During Fires on OCS 1998.......................................................................... A-12 Activity During Injuries on OCS 1998...................................................................... A-13 Average Depth of Event Type on OCS 1998 ............................................................ A-14 Type of Operation During All Incidents on OCS 1998.............................................. A-15 Type of Operation During Blowouts on OCS 1998................................................... A-16 Type of Operation During Explosions on OCS 1998 ................................................ A-17 Type of Operation During Fatalities on OCS 1998 ................................................... A-18 Type of Operation During Fires on OCS 1998.......................................................... A-19 Type of Operation During Injuries on OCS 1998...................................................... A-20 Type of Activity During Blowouts ........................................................................... A-21 Type of Activity During Explosions ......................................................................... A-22 Type of Activity During Fatalities ............................................................................ A-23 Type of Activity During Fires................................................................................... A-24 Type of Activity During Injuries............................................................................... A-25 Number of Blowouts per Year on OCS..................................................................... A-26 Number of Explosions per Year on OCS .................................................................. A-27 Overall Causes of All Incidents on OCS 1998 .......................................................... A-28

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Abbreviations and Acronyms AC -Alternating current bbl -Barrel(s) Bbbl -Billion barrels Bcf -Billion cubic feet BOP -Blowout Preventer BOPD -Barrels of oil per day BOPE -Barrels of oil per day equivalent BWPD -Barrels of water per day CFR -Code of Federal Regulations CT -Coil tubing CTM -Coil tubing measurement CO2 -Carbon dioxide ESD -Emergency Shut Down ft -Foot (feet) FTP -Flowing tubing pressure G/L -Gas/Liquid gal -Gallon GOM -Gulf of Mexico H2S -Hydrogen sulfide HI -High Island in -Inch LEL -Lower Exposure Limit LSH -Level Safety High LSL -Level Safety Low MCC -Master Control Center MCFD -Thousand cubic feet per day MD -Measured depth MM -Million MMbbl -million barrels MMS -Minerals Management Service MOU -Memorandum of Understanding M/V -Mobile vessel NE. -Northeast NRC -National Response Center OCS -Outer Continental Shelf OCSLA -Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act POV -Pressure operated valves Ppg -Pounds per gallon PSE -Pressure Safety Element PSH -Pressure Safety High psi -Pounds per square inch PSL -Pressure Safety Low PSV -Pressure Safety Valve RTU -Remote Terminal Unit

v

SCADA -Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition SCSSV -Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety Valve SITP -Shut-in tubing pressure SS -Stainless steel SSSV -Subsurface safety valve SW. -Southwest TD -Total depth TIMS -Technical Information Management System TLP -Tension leg platform TSE -Temperature Safety Element (fusible material) TSH -Temperature Safety High USCG -U.S. Coast Guard VRS -Vapor Recovery System VRU -Vapor Recovery Unit WHRU -Waste Heat Recovery Unit

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Foreword The following is a compilation of incidents that occurred on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) during the year 1998. This report lists all of the incidents separately by Region and then by type of event. (Note: There is no section for the Alaska Region in this report because no incidents occurred there during the 1998 reporting period.) After the listing of the individual incidents, we have a section that presents the information graphically.

Data in this report have been compiled from the Technical Information Management System (TIMS) database for the Pacific and Gulf of Mexico OCS Regions. It was cross-checked by performing multiple analyses and by checking paper records on file in Minerals Management Service’s (MMS’s) headquarters office in Herndon, VA. TIMS is a database created by MMS for both internal and public use. In addition to containing information on OCS incidents, TIMS also includes data on the following items: platforms, number and type of wellbores, seismic analysis, leasing data, production rates, and royalty management.

One of the major concerns with the incident component of TIMS is data quality. Both MMS and industry are placing increased emphasis on operator performance and safety. With this increased attention to safety, the quality of the incident data in TIMS takes on additional importance. As both MMS and industry rely more and more on incident data and data analysis, the potential impact of the incident information contained in TIMS will also increase.

As shown in this report, there are a large number of incidents caused by human error. Because of the wide scope of this definition, MMS will be working in the future to narrow the definition of this field.

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viii

Executive Summary This report presents OCS incident information for 1998. Incident data are based solely on MMS's TIMS database, a nationwide OCS information gathering system. Incident information included in this report has been categorized by region, year, and type, and sorted by date.

Overall, the main cause of incidents in 1998 was human error, followed by equipment failure. The majority of these incidents occurred during production operations. Fires were the most frequent type of incident reported to the MMS in 1998, followed by injuries. Both the number of fires and number of injuries recorded in TIMS tripled from 1995 to 1997 (Appendix A). Part of this increase may be a result of changes in Gulf of Mexico (GOM) record keeping requirements effective August 1996. The 1998 fires and injuries showed a return to the 1996 levels. The majority of the reported injuries were minor.

Causes of Fatalities on OCS 1998 The primary cause of fatalities (14) was human error, followed by equipment Welding Other 12% failure. Most fatalities occurred during 0% Weather Equipment Failure 24% production operations, followed by drilling, 0% then well completion, and finally welding operations. Slip/Trip/Fall 18%

Blowouts (7) were mainly a result of equipment failure and human error, resulting primarily from drilling operations, followed by well completion activities. Explosions mainly occurred during Human Error production activities and were caused by 46% equipment failure and human error.

During 1998 there was an increase in activity in water depths greater than Causes of Blowouts on OCS 1998

1,000 feet, yet a decrease in the number of incidents occurring in those Other 25% water depths. Equipment Failure 37% Recently, an MMS workgroup completed a review of crane incidents Welding

that occurred between January 1995 0% Weather and August 1998. The report 0% Slip/Trip/Fall discusses the workgroup's review and 0%

analysis of these accidents and makes recommendations for improving crane Human Error safety. 38%

ix

The workgroup reviewed 34 crane incidents that occurred from 1995 to August 1998, resulting in 7 fatalities and 20 injuries. The most significant finding of the review was that crane riggers appear to be at the greatest risk during crane operations. During this time, all 7 of the fatalities and most of the injuries involved crane riggers or other personnel working around cranes.

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Introduction I. Authority

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) requires that either MMS or the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) prepare within 30 days a public report for all deaths, serious injuries, major fires, and major oil spillages (>200 barrels) resulting from OCS mineral operations. To carry out the requirements in OCSLA, the MMS and the USCG have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that provides guidelines for identifying the agency that will normally conduct an accident investigation and prepare the report. Joint investigations can also be conducted.

II. Importance and Relation to Other Aspects of Safety Program

A primary mission of the MMS is to manage OCS resources in a safe and environmentally sound manner. Safety of operations has always been a key element of the Federal Government's offshore program. Many factors have contributed to improved safety and environmental protection over the years, including the development of operating regulations, increased regulatory oversight, improved industry safety programs, and improved technology.

Accurate incident reporting, record-keeping, and analysis of incident information is an integral component of a properly functioning regulatory program, and a safe OCS oil and gas industry. Incident data can be used to identify operational trends and fluctuations from the norm. Evaluation of this information can then be used as a benchmark to evaluate the performance of the industry. Based on this evaluation, areas of concern can be identified and addressed through a variety of measures including regulatory changes, development of technical standards, and the implementation of new inspection practices or new research initiatives.

III. Accident Reporting Requirements and Policies

The MMS regulations at 30 CFR 250.191 specify industry accident reporting requirements. They require OCS lessees to notify MMS of all serious accidents, any death or serious injury, and all fires, explosions, or blowouts connected with any activities or operations on the lease. All spills of oil or other liquid pollutants must also be reported to MMS. These regulations also address the preparation of public accident reports and procedures used in conducting accident investigations.

The MMS and the USCG are in the process of developing a joint accident reporting structure. This Subpart A revision will include a web-based initiative to allow joint reporting of MMS/ USCG incidents in one location on the web. A proposed rule will be published during the first half of 2000 requesting comment on this proposal.

Incidents Associated with Oil and Gas Operations – OCS 1998 1

Introduction

In 1992, MMS instituted a basic policy for collecting accident data and conducting accident investigations. Under that policy, MMS must investigate all major accidents, some minor accidents, and all blowouts. The degree of investigation is left to the discretion of the District Supervisor. Major accidents are fires and explosions that result in damage of $1 million or more, liquid hydrocarbon spills of 200 barrels or more during a period of 30 days, or accidents involving a fatality or serious injury that causes substantial impairment of any bodily unit or function.

The regions followed this policy until August 1996, when the GOM Region began implementation of a more stringent policy. Since that date, the GOM Region investigates all fires and explosions, all blowouts, all spills greater than one barrel, all accident-related fatalities, all collisions involving structural damage to OCS facilities, and injuries and accidents requiring repairs on a case-by-case basis. The degree of investigation is still left to the discretion of the District Supervisor. The Pacific Region continues to follow the 1992 policy previously discussed. The MMS completes an Accident Investigation Report (Form 2010) for all accidents investigated and enters the information into TIMS.

IV. General Incident Trends

The following trends were found upon analyzing the data compiled for this report.

• The primary causes of fatalities (14) Overall Causes of All Incidents on OCS 1998 were human error (8) and equipment failure (4). The 14 deaths were the result Other 14% of 11 individual incidents. Three of the Welding 11 individual incidents resulted in 0% Weather Equipment Failure multiple fatalities. 4% 35%

• Explosions (4) were a result of Slip/Trip/Fall 9% equipment failure (2) and human error (2), resulting primarily from production operations.

• Overall, the main cause of incidents in 1998 was human error (75), followed by Human Error equipment failure (72). 38%

The following chart shows a comparison of offshore incidents over the last 4 years. Comparing

2 Incidents Associated with Oil and Gas Operations – OCS 1998

Introduction

it to activity on the OCS normalizes the data. This activity is measured by total wells drilled and the oil and gas production on the OCS. The year 1998 has seen a decline in the upward trend that had been in place since the beginning of our analysis.

Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 Incidents 94 180 258 193 Development Wells 520 562 601 556 Exploration Wells 278 327 353 437 Wells Drilled 798 889 954 993 Oil Produced (MMbbl) 429 426 466 491 Gas Produced (Bcf) 5,015 5,066 5,222 5,115 Incidents per Well Total Drilled .12 .20 .27 .19 Incidents per MMbbl Produced .22 .42 .55 .39 Incidents per Bcf Produced .02 .04 .05 .04

1998 Crane Incidents

There have been three very serious accidents involving cranes on the OCS in 1998. The first occurred on May 10 when a platform crane failed while offloading a rental crane and killed two workers. Ocean Energy is the operator of the platform. The early indication is that the crane was poorly maintained and that mechanical failure contributed to the accident.

The second serious accident occurred on June 2 and it too involved the offloading of a rental crane. This event differed from the first accident in that the operation of a crane did not factor into the accident. The apparent cause of this accident was the improper disassembly of the rental crane (human error - lack of proper training, preparation, and supervision). One worker was killed and three others were seriously injured. Amoco is the operator of the platform and Sundowner is the contractor that was offloading the crane.

On October 27, another serious crane accident occurred. The crane operator was killed when the crane broke from its pedestal while lifting a load on a Marathon platform.

There have been at least six other minor incidents that involved crane operations in 1998. Three incidents caused significant damage to crane booms when equipment failed or the operator made an error. Two other incidents appear to have been caused by improper or poor techniques by "riggers" on supply boats. (For this report, riggers are personnel who attach or unhook loads or otherwise assist with crane operations.) One of these incidents resulted in a minor injury and the other caused the spillage of 400 gallons of motor oil. The last incident caused no damage or injuries when a fast line parted.

Incidents Associated with Oil and Gas Operations – OCS 1998 3

Introduction

Another incident should be included with these 1998 crane incidents because it involves the hoisting of materials. This accident involved a hoist used to move a blowout preventer (BOP) stack and resulted in the year’s first fatality (February 6). A roughneck was pinned between the BOP stack and a structural beam after one of the hoist’s wire ropes failed. Apparently the wire rope had corroded, possibly leading to its failure.

1998 Deepwater (>1,000 ft) Incidents

There were at least 21 deepwater incidents in 1998 according to the Accident/Incident forms and the Accident Investigation Reports contained in our TIMS database. Incidents were mostly minor, involving personnel injuries and fires. There were eight injuries and eight fires. There were also four significant pollution events in deepwater with an average spill size of 100 bbl.

The chart below shows the average water depth of each of the types of incidents on the OCS. Most of the incident types occurred in water depths less than 1,000 feet. The only exception was significant pollution events. These greater than 50 bbl spills occurred at an average water depth of 2,500 feet, significantly deeper than the rest of the incidents.

Average Depth of Event Type on OCS 1998

0 -117 -130 -140 -164 -388 -500 -394 -600

-1000

Water Depth

-1500 -2500

-2000

-2500 Explosions Pipeline Collisions Blowouts Fires Event Type Fatalities Injuries Sig Poll

4 Incidents Associated with Oil and Gas Operations – OCS 1998

Gulf of Mexico Region Blowouts – 1998

Date: 06-Jan-1998 Operator: Hall-Houston Oil Company

Investigation: Complete Activity: Exploration

Lease: G12886 Event(s): Blowout

Area: South Marsh Island Operation: Drilling

Block: 17 Cause: Poor cement job on casing

Rig/Platform: Marine XV Water Depth: 80’

Remarks: The crew ran the 10-3/4 inch casing to a depth of 1,793 feet (MD) on Well No. 3, and cementing operations began. During cementing operations, the crew lost returns at the surface for approximately 5 minutes, and then they regained returns. After they completed cementing operations, the crew washed out cement down to the mud line hanger with a 1-1/4 inch line. They made a rough cut on the 10-3/4 inch casing, and laid down one joint of casing. They landed the diverter, and began to nipple down the diverter’s chains and cables. The well suddenly vented fluid from the 10-3/4 inch by 16 inch annulus. The crew began to nipple up the diverter by installing several bolts. They then noticed flow from the bell nipple, and closed the diverter. While the well was flowing on diverter, the crew began rigging up the Haliburton unit to kill the well. Gas began leaking around the seals of the 16 inch wellhead. They decided to evacuate the rig. All personnel were accounted for. They monitored the well from a workboat for the next three days. On 1/9/98 a crew boarded the rig, started the standby generator, rigged up fire hoses for a water curtain, removed the bell nipple, re-hung the Texas deck, and hung the 13-3/8 inch BOP stack. The flow had slowed considerably, and eventually stopped. On 1/11/98 the well was dead. The