OCS Report MMS 2001-015

Incidents Associated with Oil and Gas Operations Outer Continental Shelf 1999

U.S. Department of the Interior Minerals Management Service Engineering and Operations Division

OCS Report MMS 2001-015

Incidents Associated with Oil and Gas Operations Outer Continental Shelf 1999

Authors: Data Collected By District Personnel Database Managed By Regional and District Personnel Publication Compiled By Kristen Stanley Cheryl Anderson L. John Chadwell Karen Sagall

This report can also be obtained from the MMS homepage at http://www.mms.gov.

U.S. Department of the Interior Minerals Management Service Herndon, VA Engineering and Operations Division 2001

Foreword The following is a compilation of incidents that occurred on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) during 1999. This report lists all of the incidents in each OCS Region by event type. (Note: This report does not have a section for the Alaska Region because no incidents occurred there in 1999.) An appendix that presents the information graphically follows the incident listings.

The Technical Information Management System (TIMS) is a database created by the Minerals Management Service (MMS) for both internal and public use. TIMS contains OCS information, such as incident data, platforms, number and type of wellbores, seismic analyses, leasing data, production rates, and royalty management. Data in this report have been compiled from the TIMS database for the Pacific and Gulf of Mexico OCS Regions. The MMS headquarters office in Herndon, Virginia performed multiple analyses and reviewed paper records in order to verify the data contained in TIMS.

A major concern with the incident component of TIMS is data quality. Since both MMS and industry are placing increased emphasis on operator performance and safety, it is even more important to have quality incident data in TIMS. The potential impact of the incident information contained in TIMS will increase as MMS and industry become more reliant on incident data and data analysis.

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Contents Foreword ....................................................................................................................................... iii

Abbreviations and Acronyms ....................................................................................................... vi

Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... viii

Introduction.................................................................................................................................... 1 I. Authority...................................................................................................................... 1 II. Importance and Relation to Other Aspects of Safety Program.................................... 1 III. Accident Reporting Requirements and Policies .......................................................... 1 IV. General Incident Trends............................................................................................... 2 Events..................................................................................................................... 2 Causes .................................................................................................................... 3 Operations .............................................................................................................. 3 Activities ................................................................................................................ 4 Crane Incidents ...................................................................................................... 5 1999 Deepwater (>1,000 ft) Incidents ................................................................... 5

Gulf of Mexico Region Blowouts-1999......................................................................................................................... 7 Fatalities-1999........................................................................................................................ 10 Collisions-1999...................................................................................................................... 12 Explosions-1999 .................................................................................................................... 16 Fires-1999 .............................................................................................................................. 20 Injuries-1999 .......................................................................................................................... 49 Crane Incidents-1999 ............................................................................................................. 63 Significant Pollution Events (>50bbls)-1999......................................................................... 66 Pipeline Events-1999 ............................................................................................................. 67

Pacific Region Injuries-1999 .......................................................................................................................... 71 Pipeline Events-1999 ............................................................................................................. 72

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Appendix – Graphical Summary of OCS Incident Data – 1999

OCS Events by Category: 1995-2000................................................................................. A-1 Number of OCS Events 1999 .............................................................................................. A-2 Average Depth of OCS Events 1999 ................................................................................... A-3 Overall Causes of OCS Incidents 1999 ............................................................................... A-4 Causes of OCS Blowouts 1999............................................................................................ A-5 Causes of OCS Fatalities 1999 ............................................................................................ A-6 Causes of OCS Collisions 1999........................................................................................... A-7 Causes of OCS Explosions 1999 ......................................................................................... A-8 Causes of OCS Fires 1999 ................................................................................................... A-9 Causes of OCS Injuries 1999............................................................................................. A-10 Causes of OCS Crane Incidents 1999................................................................................ A-11 Causes of OCS Significant Pollution Events 1999 ............................................................ A-12 Causes of OCS Pipeline Events 1999 ................................................................................ A-13 Activity During OCS Incidents 1999................................................................................. A-14 Activity During OCS Blowouts 1999 ................................................................................ A-15 Activity During OCS Fatalities 1999................................................................................. A-16 Activity During OCS Collisions 1999 ............................................................................... A-17 Activity During OCS Explosions 1999 ............................................................................. A-18 Activity During OCS Fires 1999 ....................................................................................... A-19 Activity During OCS Injuries 1999 ................................................................................... A-20 Activity During OCS Crane Incidents 1999 ...................................................................... A-21 Operations During OCS Incidents 1999 ............................................................................ A-22 Operations During OCS Blowouts 1999............................................................................ A-23 Operations During OCS Fatalities 1999 ............................................................................ A-24 Operations During OCS Collisions 1999........................................................................... A-25 Operations During OCS Explosions 1999 ......................................................................... A-26 Operations During OCS Fires 1999................................................................................... A-27 Operations During OCS Injuries 1999............................................................................... A-28 Operations During OCS Crane Incidents 1999.................................................................. A-29 Operations During OCS Significant Pollution Events 1999.............................................. A-30 Operations During OCS Pipeline Events 1999.................................................................. A-31 Percentage of Total OCS Incidents 1995-2000 ................................................................. A-32 Total Number of OCS Incidents 1995-2000...................................................................... A-33 Number of OCS Events 1995-2000 ................................................................................... A-34 Number of OCS Blowouts 1967-2000............................................................................... A-35 Number of OCS Explosions 1967-2000 ............................................................................ A-36 Number of OCS Collisions 1995-2000.............................................................................. A-37 Number of OCS Fatalities 1995-2000 ............................................................................... A-38 Number of OCS Fires 1995-2000 ...................................................................................... A-39 Number of OCS Injuries 1995-2000.................................................................................. A-40 Number of OCS Significant Pollution Events 1995-2000................................................. A-41 Number of OCS Pipeline Events 1995-2000 ..................................................................... A-42 Number of OCS Crane Incidents 1995-2000..................................................................... A-43 Operations Associated with OCS Fires 1997-1999 ........................................................... A-44

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Abbreviations and Acronyms AC -Alternating Current bbl -Barrel(s) Bbbl -Billion barrels Bcf -Billion cubic feet BDV -Blow Down Valve BOP -Blowout Preventer BOPD -Barrels of Oil Per Day BOPE -Barrels of Oil Per Day Equivalent BS&W -Basic Sediment & Water BWPD -Barrels of Water Per Day CFR -Code of Federal Regulations CT -Coil Tubing CTM -Coil Tubing Measurement CO2 -Carbon Dioxide ESD -Emergency Shut Down ft -Foot (feet) FTP -Flowing Tubing Pressure G/L -Gas/Liquid gal -Gallon GOM -Gulf of Mexico H2S -Hydrogen Sulfide HI -High Island in -Inch LEL -Lower Exposure Limit LSH -Level Safety High LSL -Level Safety Low MCC -Master Control Center MCFD -ThoU.S.A.nd Cubic Feet per Day MD -Measured Depth MM -Million MMbbl -Million barrels MMS -Minerals Management Service MOU -Memorandum of Understanding MUX -Make Up Crossover (X) M/V -Mobile Vessel NE -Northeast NRC -National Response Center OCS -Outer Continental Shelf OCSLA -Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act POV -Pressure Operated Valves PPE -Personnel Protection Equipment Ppg -Pounds per gallon PSE -Pressure Safety Element

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PSH -Pressure Safety High psi -Pounds per square inch psig -Pounds per square inch, gauge PSL -Pressure Safety Low PSV -Pressure Safety Valve ROV -Remotely Operated Vehicle RTU -Remote Terminal Unit SCADA -Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition SCSSV -Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety Valve SDV -Shutdown Valve SITP -Shut-in Tubing Pressure SS -Stainless Steel SSSV -Subsurface Safety Valve SSV -Surface Safety Valve SW -Southwest TD -Total Depth TIMS -Technical Information Management System TLP -Tension Leg Platform TSE -Temperature Safety Element (fusible material) TSH -Temperature Safety High USCG -U.S. Coast Guard VRS -Vapor Recovery System VRU -Vapor Recovery Unit WHRU -Waste Heat Recovery Unit

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Executive Summary This report presents OCS incident information for 1999. Incident data are based solely on MMS's TIMS database, a nationwide OCS information gathering system. The incidents included in this report have been categorized by region and event and sorted by date.

Equipment failure, the main cause of incidents in 1999, was a cause of 65 incidents; human error was a factor in 58. The operation with the highest incident occurrence was production, which had 42 incidents. Fires were the most frequent type of incidents reported to the MMS, followed by injuries; there were 75 fires and 47 injuries.

Causes of the five fatalities include human error and equipment failure. No operation is associated with more than one fatality. Fatalities occurred during production operations, completion work, motor vessel operations, pulling anchors on a drilling rig, and diving work.

There were 35 incidents resulting in injuries and 47 people hurt. Injuries primarily occurred due to human error and most happened during production operations.

There were five blowouts, three of which resulted from lost circulation and swabbing. The other two are pending completion of an investigation. Most blowouts occurred during drilling operations, and one happened during completion and workover activities.

Five of the seven explosions occurred during production activities. Two happened during drilling operations. The explosions were caused mainly by human error and equipment failure.

There were 23 incidents in water depths greater than 1,000 feet. The average depth for deepwater incidents was 2,511 feet, as opposed to 526 feet for all incidents.

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Introduction I. Authority

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) requires either MMS or the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) to prepare within 30 days a public report for all deaths, serious injuries, major fires, and major oil spills (>200 barrels) resulting from OCS mineral operations. To carry out the requirements in OCSLA, the MMS and the USCG have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that provides guidelines for identifying the agency that will normally conduct an accident investigation and prepare the report. Joint investigations can also be conducted.

II. Importance and Relation to Other Aspects of Safety Program

A primary mission of the MMS is to manage OCS resources in a safe and environmentally sound manner. Safety of operations has always been a key element of the Federal Government's offshore program. Many factors have contributed to improved safety and environmental protection over the years, including the development of operating regulations, increased regulatory oversight, improved industry safety programs, and improved technology.

Accurate incident reporting, record-keeping, and analysis of incident information is an integral component of a properly functioning regulatory program, and a safe OCS oil and gas industry. Incident data can be used to identify operational trends and fluctuations from the norm. Evaluation of this information can then be used as a benchmark to evaluate the performance of the industry. Based on this evaluation, areas of concern can be identified and addressed through a variety of measures including regulatory changes, development of technical standards, and the implementation of new inspection practices or new research initiatives.

III. Accident Reporting Requirements and Policies

The MMS regulations at 30 CFR 250.191 specify industry accident reporting requirements. They require OCS lessees to notify MMS of all serious accidents, any death or serious injury, and all fires, explosions, or blowouts connected with any activities or operations on the lease. All spills of oil or other liquid pollutants must also be reported to MMS. These regulations also address the preparation of public accident reports and procedures used in conducting accident investigations.

The MMS and the USCG are in the process of developing a joint accident reporting structure. This Subpart A revision will include a web-based initiative to allow joint reporting of MMS/ USCG incidents in one location on the web. A proposed rule will be published during the first half of 2001 requesting comment on this proposal.

1 Incidents Associated with Oil and Gas Operations – OCS 1999

Introduction

In 1992, MMS instituted a basic policy for collecting accident data and conducting accident investigations. Under that policy, MMS must investigate all major accidents, some minor accidents, and all blowouts. The degree of investigation is left to the discretion of the District Supervisor. Major accidents are fires and explosions that result in damage of $1 million or more, liquid hydrocarbon spills of 200 barrels or more during a period of 30 days, or accidents involving a fatality or serious injury that causes substantial impairment of any bodily unit or function.

The regions followed this policy until August 1996, when the GOM Region began implementation of a more stringent policy. Since that date, the GOM Region investigates: • All accident-related fatalities • All injuries • All explosions • All blowouts • All fires • All collisions involving structural damage to OCS facilities • Accidents requiring repairs on a case-by-case basis • All spills greater than one barrel

The degree of investigation is still left to the discretion of the District Supervisor. The Pacific Region continues to follow the 1992 policy previously discussed. The MMS completes an Accident Investigation Report (Form 2010) for all accidents investigated and enters the information into TIMS.

IV. General Incident Trends

The following trends were found upon analyzing the data compiled for this report.

Events

OCS Events 1999 • The most common event on the 80 OCS in 1999 was fires. Of the 75 70 fires reported, 49 (61%) were 60 caused by equipment failure and 20

Number of Incidents 50 (25%) were caused by human error. 40

30 • The second most common 20 event was injuries. There were 47 10 reported from 35 separate 0 incidents; human error caused 23 Blowouts Crane Explosions Fires Collisions Injuries Sig Poll Pipeline Fatalities (48%) and equipment failure Events caused 9 (19%) injuries.

Incidents Associated with Oil and Gas Operations – OCS 1999 2

Introduction

• In 1998, fires and injuries were also the leading events reported. There were 90 fires and 66 injuries. Equipment failure caused 50% of the fires; human error caused 28%. Human error was responsible for 46% of injuries and slip/trip/fall was the cause of 28%.

• The number of fatalities decreased in 1999 to the lowest level in at least 4 years. In 1999, there were 5 fatalities. There were 14 fatalities in 1998 and 11 in 1997.

Causes

• Overall, equipment failure was the main cause of incidents in 1999. It was responsible for 69 incidents (38%), followed by human error in 61 incidents (34%).

• In 1998, 72 incidents (37%) were due to equipment failure and 75 (38%) were caused by human error.

• Two of the 5 fatalities in 1999 were caused by Overall Causes of OCS Incidents 1999

human error and equipment failure; two are Other still under investigation. 19%

• Human error was responsible for 48% of the Equipment Failure 38% Weather

injuries. Other causes comprised 21% of the 6%

injuries and equipment failure was a cause in Slip/Trip/Fall 3%

19%.

• Human error contributed to five of the seven Human Error

explosions and equipment failure was a factor 34%

in four. The explosions occurred primarily during production operations.

Operations

Operations During OCS Incidents 1999 • Ninety four (54%) of incidents that occurred in 1999 happened during production operations, Other 14% 29 incidents (17%) occurred during drilling operations, and 14 (8%) incidents involved motor M/V 8% vessel operations. P&A 1% Workover 3% Production • This trend was also apparent in 1998 where 63% of incidents occurred during production- Completion 54% 3%

related operations and 18% happened during Drilling drilling-related operations. 17%

3 Incidents Associated with Oil and Gas Operations – OCS 1999

Introduction

Activities

• One hundred twenty incidents (72%) happened while performing development activities and 25 (15%) happened during exploration activities in 1999. • In 1998, 133 incidents (69%) happened during development activities and 23 (12%) happened during exploration activities.

Activity During OCS Incidents 1999 (Excluding Pipeline and Significant Pollution Incidents)

100%

80%

Activity Percentage 60%

40%

20%

0% Blowouts Collisions Explosions Fatalities Fires Injuries Crane Exploration 1 0 1 1 10 7 5 Development 4 10 6 4 65 30 1

Event

The following chart shows a comparison of offshore incidents from 1995 to 1999. To normalize the data, the number of events is compared with activity on the OCS. The activity is measured in total wells drilled and oil and gas produced on the OCS. The rate of incidents per activity is the lowest it has been since 1995. This suggests more attention is being paid to offshore safety now than has been in the past few years.

Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Incidents 94 180 258 193 166 Development Wells 520 562 601 556 614 Exploration Wells 278 327 353 437 348 Wells Drilled 798 889 954 993 962 Oil Produced (MMbbl) 429 426 466 491 534 Gas Produced (Bcf) 5,015 5,066 5,222 5,115 5,134 Incidents per Well Total Drilled .12 .20 .27 .19 .17 Incidents per MMbbl Produced .22 .42 .55 .39 .31 Incidents per Bcf Produced .02 .04 .05 .04 .03

Incidents Associated with Oil and Gas Operations – OCS 1999 4

Introduction

Crane Incidents

An MMS workgroup reviewed the 34 crane incidents that occurred between January 1995 and August 1998. These incidents resulted in 7 fatalities and 20 injuries. The report presents the workgroup's review and analysis of these accidents and states the group’s recommendations for improving crane safety. The report can be found at http://www.mms.gov/cranes/report.htm.

The review’s most significant finding was that crane riggers appear to be at the greatest risk during crane operations. All of the seven fatalities and most of the injuries that occurred during the time period studied involved crane riggers or other personnel working around cranes.

There were 6 crane incidents in 1999, more than any previous year. As of October 22, 2000, there were 8 crane incidents in 2000. These numbers demonstrate the need for even more attention to be given to conducting safe crane operations on the OCS.

1999 Deepwater (>1,000 ft) Incidents

There were 24 deepwater incidents in 1999; 16 of these were fires. Incidents were mostly minor. There were no fatalities or significant pollution events, and most did not cause serious damage.

The chart below shows the average water depth of each of the types of incidents on the OCS in 1999. The average depth for deepwater incidents was 2,448 feet, as compared with an average depth of 526 feet for all incidents.

Average Depth of OCS Incidents 1999

0 100 200

Water Depth (feet) 300 400 500 600 700 800

Injuries Fatalities Pipeline Explosions Sig Poll Collisions Crane Blowouts Fires

Event

Further offshore information can be found on the OCS Safety Facts sheet at http://www.mms.gov/stats/PDFs/SafetyMay2000.pdf.

5 Incidents Associated with Oil and Gas Operations – OCS 1999

Introduction

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Incidents Associated with Oil and Gas Operations – OCS 1999 6

Gulf of Mexico Region Blowouts – 1999

Date: 10-Feb-1999 Operator: Union Pacific Resources Company

Investigation: Complete Activity: Exploration

Lease: G14016 Event(s): Blowout, saltwater flow

Area: Mississippi Canyon Operation: Drilling

Block: 711 Cause: Lost Circulation

Rig/Platform: Glomar Celtic Sea Water Depth: 2,955 feet

Remarks: While drilling a 17½-inch hole, the crew encountered lost circulation. Drilling continued until losses became excessive. The crew filled the hole with sea water, ran a 16-inch liner below the lost circulation zone, and cemented with partial returns. They performed a successful shoe test after drilling out. The crew drilled ahead and, while circulating out, experienced a continual influx of salt water, so they pulled above the sand and increased the mud weight. They filled the hole with sea water on the backside. With the well static, they tripped out to the 16-inch shoe and spotted a lost circulation material pill. To cure the lost circulation problem suspected at the 16- inch shoe, they bullheaded a polymer pill across the shoe, but it was unsuccessful. They tried four cement jobs at the 16-inch shoe. The crew discovered that the well bore was in communication with the weak zone previously