Fishing 2009 Safety Digest

Front cover photograph courtesy of the Irish Coastguard

The Marine Accident Investigation Branch is an independent part of the Department for Transport, (DfT) and is completely separate from the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA). The Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents is responsible to the Secretary of State for Transport. The offices of the Branch are presently located at Carlton House, Carlton Place, Southampton, SO15 2DZ. We will relocate to Mountbatten House, Grosvenor Square, Southampton SO15 2JU in August 2009. This Safety Digest draws the attention of the marine community to some of the lessons arising from investigations into recent accidents. This information is published to inform the fishing industry and the public of the general circumstances of marine accidents and to draw out the lessons to be learned. The sole purpose of the Safety Digest is to prevent similar accidents happening again. The content must necessarily be regarded as tentative and subject to alteration if additional evidence becomes available. The articles do not assign fault or blame nor do they determine liability. The lessons often extend beyond the events of the incidents themselves to ensure the maximum value can be achieved. Extracts can be published without specific permission providing the source is duly acknowledged. The Safety Digest and other publications are available free of charge to anyone by contacting the MAIB. Contact details are provided below.

The telephone number for general use is 023 8039 5500

The Branch fax number is 023 8023 2459

The e-mail address is maib@dft.gsi.gov.uk

Safety Digests are available on the Internet: www.maib.gov.uk

If you wish to report an accident please call our 24 hour reporting line 023 8023 2527

The role of the MAIB is to contribute to safety at sea by determining the causes and circumstances of accidents, and working with others to reduce the likelihood of such causes and circumstances recurring in the future.

Extract from

The Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2005 The fundamental purpose of investigating an accident under these regulations is to determine its circumstances and the cause with the aim of improving the safety of life at sea and the avoidance of accidents in the future. It is not the purpose to apportion liability, nor, except so far as is necessary to achieve the fundamental purpose, to apportion blame.

Contents Chief Inspector’s Foreword 4

1 Brief Visit to Deck Costs Life 6 2 Look Out or Lose Out 8 3 Sea Survival Training – Payback Time 10 4 The Flames Were Supposed to Stay Inside the Heater 12 5 Eyes Available But Not Used 14 6 Unguarded Machinery is a Riddle 15 7 Small Hole – Costs a Life 18 8 Complacency Kills 20 9 Even a Short Time in the Sea Can be Fatal 22 10 Mystery Fire Sinks Potter 24 11 Insecure Fiddle Leaves Crewman in Hot Water 26 12 Double Tragedy 28 13 Water in Fuel – A Recipe for Expensive Problems 30 14 Between a Rock and a Hard Place 32 15 When Making a Cup of Tea Wrecks a Crabber 34 16 Wooden You Know 36

Fishing Vessel Accident Statistics 38 Major Accident Locations Chart 40 MAIB Published Reports 41 Glossary 42 MAIB Report Request Form 43

Chief Inspector’s

20 Fishing vessels were lost and 8 Fishermen died in onboard accidents in 2008

Foreword You don’t need me to tell you how dangerous fishing can be. However, the usual justification – “it is a dangerous industry, and the sea is an unforgiving environment” – is no longer valid. Almost none of the recent deaths and fishing vessel losses were unavoidable; few were as a result of vessels being overwhelmed by the sea. Awareness of the risks, safe practices, good maintenance, sensible safety equipment and trained crews would have prevented nearly all recent accidents.

It is telling that accidents often happen to the most experienced fishermen. When you are new to a job, you are very aware of the risks, and you are cautious in everything that you do. When you have done something for a thousand times without problems, you have lost that sense of danger, and no longer take the same precautions. When we talk to fishermen after accidents, particularly when a fellow fisherman has died, they nearly always have identified what they could have done more safely, and berate themselves for not having some simple safety measures. If you take 10 minutes or so every week just to think through how you do your work – and to discuss it with your crew – you could save yourselves the dreadful self- recriminations that always come after accidents.

The tragic loss of 3 crew in a fire onboard Vision II last August, brought into focus a new hazard developing in the fishing industry. With the advent of more fishermen from overseas, more crew are sleeping onboard their vessel in their home port. Many vessels are not suited to this, lacking even the most basic safety requirements. Alarms are normally fitted to sound in the wheelhouse, with the result that fishermen sleeping below cannot hear them. More worrying still, many alarms are disabled when alongside due to limitations in shore power. Emergency escape routes are often locked when alongside for security reasons. Access to the vessel is often dangerous, particularly at night, and perhaps when returning from having a few drinks. If you are going to have crew members living onboard, please think through the dangers and put in place appropriate safety measures.

Brief Visit to Deck Costs Life

Narrative A man was lost overboard from on board, and during a second sweep ease of access to the salmon cages) an 18m fish farming vessel while of the area he was found in the chilly which had no means of closure when returning to port, following a day’s water. His lifeless body was brought not in use. Also, large fish pumping harvesting. back ashore, where extensive CPR hoses created a serious trip hazard During the return passage, most failed to revive him. in way of these gaps. Directly inboard of the crew were in the wheelhouse It was customary for the casualty of one such gap a damaged salmon, and were unaware that one of their to wear a lifejacket while working on which had been kept aside by the colleagues had gone on deck and deck, but unfortunately at the time deceased, was discovered away from fallen overboard, until they moored of the accident he was wearing no where the crew had seen him place up alongside. There, they searched lifejacket or any other form of thermal it earlier. It is highly probable that the the boat and surrounding area, but flotation suit. crewman left the wheelhouse and were unable to find him. A fast mussel Subsequent examination of the fell overboard through the gap in the farming boat searched the area vessel highlighted two large gaps in adjacent guardrail while recovering where the man was last known to be its side guardrails (placed there for the fish from where he had left it.

The Lessons

1 The deceased crewman was recognised as being very safety conscious, and regularly wore an inflatable lifejacket when working on deck. On this 3 This vessel had missed two annual Load Line Exemption surveys. It is the owner’s obligation to present vessels for survey at the appropriate time. Had occasion, however, he had gone on deck for only a brief the required surveys been carried out on this vessel, the period, while the vessel returned to port, and had not put unprotected gaps in the guard rails would likely have been on his lifejacket. identified, and the necessary actions carried out to make No matter how brief the trip to deck, the short time them safe. taken to slip on a lifejacket may prevent an unfortunate accident from becoming fatal.

4 Aquaculture is not just a “close to shore” farming business; it is a marine industry which uses vessels

2 The vessel had been operating with unguarded openings for several years. These openings were accepted by the crew and unrecognised by the company for various activities. Just because these vessels are operating “close to shore” does not make the risks any lower than on vessels going further out to sea. This managers. Crewmen should not accept unnecessary particular company owned many vessels, of various sizes, hazards which, if ignored, can very soon become the norm yet had no proper marine superintendent to monitor their – until an accident occurs. If you suspect something is vessels’ condition and operation. Any vessel operator dangerous, bring it to the attention of crewmates and the should ensure that a suitably trained and qualified person vessel operators. It is possible that others have simply not is either employed or available to them, to ensure their noticed the potential danger, and if alerted would be more vessels comply with all the required safety standards and than happy to carry out improvements or change the way regulatory requirements, at all times. of working.

Look Out or Lose Out Narrative On a dark winter’s evening, with everything to be in order he then returning to its home port, and he did good visibility and calm seas, two decided to go below to make a drink. not look for the vessel again. During vessels underway off the south coast Due to the layout of the wheelhouse, recovery and stowage of the trawl of England were in collision, even the skipper was unable to see out of net the fishing vessel maintained a

2 though each had seen the other the forward windows once he had left relatively steady course and speed 30 minutes earlier. As a result of the the wheel position, and he therefore which, unrecognised by either accident, the fishermen lost over had not rechecked the position of the vessel, meant that they were on a 2 weeks’ income at a time when the fishing vessel before going below. collision course. With the net safely catches had been excellent. While the skipper was below, stowed, the skipper returned to the The two vessels involved were the deckhand saw the fishing wheelhouse and increased to full a small commercial vessel and a vessel coming very close on the speed on the engine. Unfortunately, fishing vessel. The commercial starboard side, and he called out he did this without looking out, and vessel observed the fishing vessel for assistance. The skipper returned thus failed to see the other vessel on its starboard bow, and was thus to the wheelhouse, but only had very close on the port bow. The the give way vessel. However, after time to stop the engines before a collision occurred within a minute only a cursory glance the assumption collision occurred. of the skipper returning to the was made that the fishing vessel On the fishing vessel, during the wheelhouse. would in fact pass clear to starboard. time leading up to the collision, the As a result of the collision, The vessel was equipped with a crew of three were preparing to haul the fishing boat suffered extensive combined track plotter/radar set and the trawl; everyone was on deck for damage to its bow area and the a young, inexperienced deckhand this task. The vessel’s floodlights repairs took more than 2 weeks; had just taken the wheel and was were all switched on. At the start of this represented a significant loss steering by reference to the track the operation the skipper, who was of income for the skipper and plotter. Thus, the radar was not in on the foredeck, glanced around crew at a time when the catches use and no distance off the fishing and saw the navigation lights of the had been particularly good. The vessel was obtained. The skipper other vessel: a green sidelight and commercial vessel was also damaged initially remained in the vicinity of single white masthead light on the by the collision, and was off charter the wheelhouse to supervise the port bow. He assumed, incorrectly, for a day, with a consequential loss deckhand. However, assuming that this was another fishing vessel of revenue.

Damage to the vessel’s bow

The Lessons

1 Both vessels failed to keep a proper lookout. On the commercial vessel the one person who could have seen the approaching vessel was inexperienced and was 3 Neither vessel made use of all the means available to them to determine if a risk of collision existed; both made assumptions based on scanty information. unable to appreciate the developing situation.

2 Both vessels saw each other at a sufficiently early stage to have taken appropriate action in ample 4 When training new recruits, ensure that they are never left unsupervised.

time to avoid a collision. However, both had assumed, at a glance, that no risk of collision existed, and neither vessel then continued to monitor the situation.

Sea Survival Training – Payback Time Narrative After 4 days of poor catches, the the situation was made worse by and lay flat on her starboard side. skipper of a 9.8 metre fishing vessel the electric bilge pump operating Water flooded along the deck and decided that the time was right to well below maximum capacity. entered the open hatch of the engine return to his home port, a passage The crew examined the pump but compartment. Both deckhands, that would take about 2 days. could find nothing untoward, and one of whom was in the engine On board the vessel was the commenced bailing by hand. The compartment, managed to escape skipper, who had about 30 years engine room hatch had been opened, by moving aft under the shelter, and fishing experience, and two young and it remained open while bailing they abandoned the vessel over the deckhands, each with 3 years continued. port side. The skipper remained in the fishing experience. The skipper About 2 hours later, the skipper wheelhouse.

3 held a Fishing Class 2 certificate of heard an update to the weather It was estimated that the vessel competency, and both he and the forecast, which predicted south- foundered within 2 minutes of the two deckhands had undertaken the westerly winds force 5 to 7, gale 8 wave striking, only 0.5 mile from the mandatory safety training courses: later. With an ineffective pump, water nearest land. It was dark, cold, and sea survival, fire-fighting, first-aid ingress, and a forecast gale, he both deckhands were dressed in no and safety awareness. Four months chose to divert to the nearest port to more than jeans and tee-shirts. After before the accident, the skipper effect repairs and take shelter. 10 to 15 minutes in the water, they had purchased a new liferaft for the These were not the skipper’s spotted the white canister of the liferaft vessel, fitted it with a hydrostatic local fishing grounds, and he did not with the inflated liferaft attached, release unit (HRU) and, thankfully, have paper or electronic charts of the albeit upside down. They managed decided that the crew would benefit area. Consequently, when he chose to right the raft, board it, bale it out, from attending another sea survival to divert he was navigating using administer sea sickness tablets and course, which they subsequently did. a basic track plotter, echo sounder release one red hand-held flare, When the vessel sailed from and GPS. He was unaware that which was immediately spotted by a the fishing grounds the weather was his diversion would take his vessel member of the public who contacted forecast as south-westerly force 3 to through two areas of renowned the coastguard. A deckhand released 4. About 4 hours into the passage, the confused and steep seas, made a second flare when they spotted alarm on the automatic bilge pump worse by the onset of bad weather the blue flashing lights of emergency alerted the skipper to unexpected against the tide. service vehicles on the shore, and a water in the bilge. Investigation Shortly after the skipper altered third flare on hearing the approach of showed that water was entering course toward land, he reduced the local lifeboat. through the stern gland, which had speed because of reduced soundings Both deckhands were been re-packed the previous day. It and, at the same time, the vessel successfully rescued and later was estimated that about 2.5 gallons entered an area of turbulent seas. airlifted to hospital. Regrettably, of sea water were entering the bilge A large wave struck the port quarter, despite an extensive search, the every 15 minutes. Unfortunately, causing the vessel to roll heavily skipper was not found.

Figure 1: Vessel before alterations

Figure 2: Vessel after alterations (right)

The Lessons

1 The vessel had been significantly modified by the current skipper. The structural 3 Insufficient charts led the skipper to stray into dangerous waters. Make sure that before On the positive side:

modifications included a considerable amount of additional top weight, which probably had the effect of setting sail, full chart coverage and associated publications for the intended passage are held on board. 5 The new liferaft had been fitted using an HRU, which undoubtedly saved two young reducing the vessel’s intact stability lives. And importantly, the training and her ability to return to the upright undertaken only months before, condition. Before making alterations, or adding additional weight, seek guidance from a qualified naval 4 New lifejackets were available on board, but were not being worn, nor were they in a location ensured that ALL the correct actions were taken by the crew, from the time they saw the raft until they were architect and, if necessary, have where they were readily available for rescued by the lifeboat. If a liferaft is the vessel inclined to confirm the escape. Look around your vessel; carried, make sure that it is properly condition of the stability. identify a readily accessible place fitted with an appropriate HRU, and for stowing lifejackets and label it; that it is carried in a position where and, if