This Safety Digest draws the attention of the leisure community to some of the lessons arising from investigations into recent accidents. It contains facts which have been determined up to the time of issue, and is published to provide information about the general circumstances of marine accidents and to draw out the lessons to be learned.

The sole purpose of the Safety Digest is to prevent similar accidents happening again. The content must necessarily be regarded as tentative and subject to alteration or correction if additional evidence becomes available. The articles do not assign fault or blame nor do they determine liability. The lessons often extend beyond the events of the incidents themselves to ensure the maximum value can be achieved.

This Safety Digest is comprised of 25 articles written in the past 8 years. For some of that time it was the MAIB’s policy to name vessels. In 2002 the decision was taken to dis-identify all Safety Digest articles so that vessel names are not included. This is intended to encourage more people to report accidents.

Extracts can be published without specific permission, providing the source is duly acknowledged.

The Safety Digest is only available from the Department for Transport, and can be obtained by applying to the MAIB. Other publications are available from the MAIB.

Marine Accident Investigation Branch

The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) is an independent part of the Department for Transport. The Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents is responsible to the Secretary of State for Transport.

Extract from The Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation Regulations 1999)

The fundamental purpose of investigating an accident under these Regulations is to determine its circumstances and the cause with the aim of improving the safety of life at sea and the avoidance of accidents in the future. It is not the purpose to apportion liability, nor, except so far as is necessary to achieve the fundamental purpose, to apportion blame.

If you wish to report an accident or incident please call our 24 hour reporting line on 023 8023 2527.

The telephone number for general use is 023 8039 5500.

The Branch fax number is 023 8023 2459. The e.mail address is maib@dft.gsi.gov.uk

Safety Digests are also available on the Internet: www.maib.gov.uk

Index

Chief Inspector’s Foreword 5

Sail craft

Case 1 Three rescued from sinking sailing yacht in Solent 8

Case 2 Yacht founders in Needles Channel in severe gale – Three killed 10

Case 3 Yacht owner loses life after failing to wear safety harness 12

Case 4 Yacht knocked down in Bay of Biscay – One man lost 14

Case 5 Young woman killed when day-boat capsizes 17

Case 6 Catamarans capsize in Weymouth Bay – Everybody saved 19

Case 7 So close to home and yet so far 22

Case 8 Tynemouth tragedy – Two killed 26

Case 9 Even Maxis capsize 31

Case 10 Vigilance, ARPA and relative speed 38

Case 11 Tragic end to a Twister 40

Case 12 Two persons lost overboard from sailing yacht 43

Case 13 Differing perspectives! 44

Case 14 Yachtswoman dragged under chain ferry 46

Case 15 Helmsman dies after recovery attempts fail 48

Case 16 Watchleader falls from bowsprit and loses consciousness in harness 50

Case 17 Vessel drying out falls over, away from Quay 52

Power craft

Case 18 Capsize of a RIB 55

Case 19 RIB – Be prepared! 58

Case 20 RIB – Kill-cord conduct 60

Case 21 Sightseeing on a bend invites trouble 62

Case 22 Flooding caused by faulty hull fittings 63

Case 23 Two drown in speedboat sinking 65

Case 24 Four die after dinghy capsizes in Sound of Iona 67

Case 25 School trip tragedy 69

List of leisure craft accident reports published since 1999 71

CASE X

Foreword

Leisure craft accident reports have appeared regularly in the MAIB Safety Digest over the past eight years. As with all MAIB reports, the objective has been to describe the basic facts, and to highlight the lessons to be learned. The Digest, of which three issues are produced each year, is distributed widely in printed form and is also available online at www.maib.gov.uk.

Much of MAIB‘s work is involved with investigating accidents to merchant ships and fishing vessels, and these appear in their own sections in each Safety Digest. The third section in each issue contains, typically, three or four reports relating to leisure craft, sail and power.

This compendium contains 25 of these articles in one, easy to refer to, volume. It has been produced in response to many requests from sailing schools and establishments, Yachtmaster instructors, and individual sailors and powerboat owners.

I very much hope that it will become an important resource for all those who take to the water in small boats, enabling more people to learn important safety lessons.

Stephen Meyer Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents

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Sail craft SAFETY DIGEST 2003

ue d fro m si nking Thre e resc ch t in Solen t sailing ya

Narrative Narrative

A small sailing yacht was chartered for a weekend However, so much flooding had taken place, in early April by a group of three men who intended because the washboards and hatch had fallen out making passage from Portsmouth to Hythe, near in the initial knockdown, that the yacht sank by Southampton. The weather forecast was for westerly the stern leaving only about four feet of the bow winds of Force 5 to 6 increasing to 7 later in the floating above the water, almost certainly due to Western Solent. trapped air.

The yacht was a small fractional rigged sloop with a It was extremely fortunate that the accident was lifting keel – 6.4 metres overall length. The charter witnessed by those onboard other, larger, craft company had a fleet of these craft which were used sailing in the area and who called for help. The either for individual "bareboat" charter or for group crew were recovered by the rescue services and activities, including racing. In the winter months the yacht, which did not completely sink, was they were permitted to operate only within taken in tow. The crew were examined in hospital Portsmouth Harbour. and later discharged.

The voyage within the harbour passed without incident but there was then a noticeable increase in wind strength as they continued, close-hauled, to the Isle of Wight shore which provided some shelter in its lee as they began to close tack westwards. A longer tack NW to enter Southampton Water was then begun and it was only at this point that the crew donned lifejackets.

Larger seas were experienced in mid-Solent and the wind increased to Force 7. A decision was taken to lower the jib. Shortly after going about on to the starboard tack, the yacht was knocked down by a gust and lay at 90º for a short time before completely inverting.

The crew were thrown into the water but were able to climb onto the upturned hull. The lifting keel, which in normal operation is kept in place only by gravity, had fallen back into its housing and was only retrieved with extreme difficulty by the crew who then managed to right the yacht.

The Lessons

1 The accident occurred because If it had happened at that time compartments or other buoyancy the yacht was being operated in of year when the water was still arrangements, relying solely upon marginal conditions. The decision very cold and in some less popular the integrity of the hull. Once to extend beyond the confines part of the UK coast, the outcome seriously flooded it was likely to of Portsmouth Harbour in the would probably have been far sink. It did. prevailing and forecast weather more serious, had there been conditions was unwise and delays in rescuing them. 5 Washboards and hatches furthermore, they should have should be properly secured so as been advised against it by the 4 Yachts of this size do not to prevent flooding in the event charter organisation. easily fall into a category. By some of a capsize. they are regarded as small 2 The yacht was not designed offshore-type craft – as witnessed 6 A lifting keel which cannot be with the intention of being able in this case by the fact that fixed in the down position will to survive a 90º knockdown in a lifejackets were not worn until hinder attempts to recover from moderate swell. several miles into the passage. a capsize. It increases inverted Others regard them as “big stability if it falls back into its 3 The crew survived because the dinghies”; – a dangerous housing, and cannot provide an incident took place in busy waters assumption as an important effective lever for the crew unless and other yachts happened to be property of nearly all sailing it can be easily retrieved. close by. They also very sensibly dinghies is their unsinkability. remained with the upturned hull. This yacht had no buoyancy

Ne e dle s n de rs in ch t fo u e g ale – Ya l in se v e r Ch an n e e e k ill ed Thr

Narrative Narrative

A group of work colleagues chartered a seaworthy the open companionway and was over one metre and well equipped yacht for five days’ coastal deep in the cabin. One of the crew went below sailing on the south coast of England in February. to make a “Mayday” call and during this time the Their experience varied but was adequate for what yacht capsized again, this time being dismasted. they planned. The two crew on deck were washed overboard, one being swept away, the other being trapped They sailed from the Solent to Poole and had hoped upside down with his head below the water. By the to extend westwards to Weymouth but forecast time he was found by the one survivor, he was dead. bad weather led to a change of plan. After a period alongside in Poole, they prepared for the return Only a fragment of the “Mayday” transmission was passage to the Solent. The forecast wind was received. It is most likely that the radio had been south-west Force 7 to 9. On leaving Poole fairway damaged in the capsize and was only transmitting the skipper reduced sail for the prevailing conditions intermittently. The “Mayday” was received by HM and headed east with the intention of approaching Coastguard and by another vessel in the Solent but the Solent via the Needles Channel which he no position was received – just an urgent request knew well. No passage plan had been filed with as to whether anyone could hear the signal. For the coastguard. want of any further information and lack of detail as to the origin or location of the vessel making It was a rough passage but the crew were confident the distress call, no search and rescue operation they were in control until they confronted the first was mounted. steep-sided seas at the seaward end of the Needles Channel. These were typical of those encountered The yacht was eventually washed up on an Isle of in this area when either the west setting ebb tide Wight beach with the one survivor on board. The three meets strong south-westerly winds or, as in this case, remaining members of the crew were recovered but heavy seas build up in the vicinity of the Shingles all had been killed through drowning or hypothermia. and the Bridge bank.

Because some difficulty was encountered in identifying their precise position, the skipper altered course to the south as he feared he was too close to the Shingles. Moments later a particularly vicious sea capsized the yacht throwing all four crew overboard. Three who were clipped on by safety harnesses managed to climb back aboard, but the skipper, who had unclipped to go below to the chart table, was lost. A great deal of water had found its way below during the capsize through

The Lessons

1 Winter sailing with gales must be taken after very careful 9 Retroflective tape on liferafts, forecast demands a high degree consideration of the dangers and, lifejackets and foul weather of responsibility by skippers. The if lacking in local knowledge, clothing stands a very good chance yacht on this occasion was well having taken the advice of others. of being sighted at night when it found. The experience of the In this instance the skipper, having is picked up by searchlight beams crew appeared adequate for the taken the decision to proceed to such as those used on RNLI lifeboats. conditions and the skipper had sea, appeared unaware of the demonstrated sound judgement grave dangers associated with 10 Publishers of sailing directions by abandoning an ambitious entering the Needles Channel in which offer advice on using the plan to sail further westwards. strong SSW winds, and especially Needles Channel should highlight in the early stages of the flood. the dangers of breaking seas in 2 In accordance with the the vicinity of the SW Shingles MSA Code of Practice for Small 5 In bad weather conditions and the Bridge bank especially Commercial Sailing Vessels, yacht safety harnesses should be attached in strong winds from the south charter firms are strongly advised to properly tested securing points round to west. The swell in such to give appropriate guidance to at all times, and when fitted, the conditions tends to build up once charterers on the use of the craft, crotch strap of lifejackets must the west-setting ebb has stopped. bearing in mind the declared be correctly fastened. Around low water the seas at the experience of the skipper and seaward end of the Needles crew, their knowledge of the 6 Conventional foul weather Channel can be particularly vicious. boat and the weather forecast. clothing offers little protection from winter water temperatures 11 Despite having to sail close o 3 No matter how short the (in this case 6 – 8 C) and in to a lee shore, the North passage, proper planning is breaking seas once the body is Channel offers a viable and essential. Given wind forecasts fully immersed. Survival times usually safer alternative to the of Force 7 to 9 the skipper had are measured in minutes. Needles Channel when entering the choice of remaining in Poole, and leaving the Solent in taking the long route to his 7 One set of flares for emergency adverse weather conditions even eventual destination by sailing use must be kept readily available when the tide is favourable. south of the Isle of Wight, or and separate from the main making for the Solent via either supply. It is recommended that the Needles Channel or the the ready-to-use set is placed Acknowledgement to Hampshire Police and HM Coroner, Isle of Wight North Channel. under cover and easily accessible by the companionway. 4 The indications are that because the tide was flooding, ie, 8 Yachtsmen are encouraged to setting north-east and with the report their passage plans to HM wind, the skipper decided that Coastguard especially in winter the Needles Channel option was when bad weather is forecast. a safe choice. The choice of which passage to adopt must always be the skipper's but the responsibility

er lo se s li fe a ft er Yac ht ow n ess w ea r sa fe ty ha rn failin g to

Narrative Narrative

The 8.5m bilge keel sailing cruiser Zoe-Anne was to signs of seasickness. Once again the yachtmaster be delivered from Chichester Harbour to Dartmouth advised the owner to put on a harness. He went for a refit. The owners sailing experience was limited below but emerged several minutes later not so a professional yachtmaster was used to carry wearing any safety equipment. out the delivery accompanied by the owner. Two to three boat lengths north of Chichester Bar The yacht was checked before departure in the late beacon, the boat was struck on the port quarter by afternoon in November and judged to be seaworthy a large wave estimated to be 6 metres high. The for the proposed passage. The necessary safety yacht was knocked down, to almost 90°, and the equipment was on board. The weather forecast owner thrown overboard. The yachtmaster threw a was for SW winds 5 to 6 increasing to 8 to 9 the dan-buoy towards him and tried, unsuccessfully, to following afternoon. A passage plan was completed start the engine. The owner could not be recovered. and although the yachtmaster realised bad weather A “Mayday” call was made at 0514 and the was forecast he was confident there were a number emergency services were alerted. The yacht ran of safe havens available en-route should they aground on a groyne at Eastoke Point at the be needed. entrance to Chichester Harbour and the yachtmaster was able to scramble ashore. The owner’s body The passage from Chichester Harbour and through was found an hour later. He could not be revived. the Solent was uneventful in a SW wind force 4 to 5, but when they reached the western end of the When the yacht was examined later, five lifejackets Solent near Hurst Point at 2230, weather forecast and harnesses were found stowed on board. warned of imminent gales so they decided to turn back. Rather than make for shelter in Lymington, Yarmouth or Southampton, all of which were close by, the owner preferred to return to the yacht’s home port of Chichester. The return trip passed without incident although the yachtmaster suggested to the owner he should don a lifejacket and harness on several occasions. The advice was ignored.

Zoe-Anne approached Chichester Bar between 0430 and 0500 the following morning. It was very shortly after high water and the south-going ebb had just started. The wind had increased noticeably and the crew, particularly the