Leisure 2nd Edition craft SAFETY DIGEST

This Safety Digest draws the attention of the leisure community to some of the lessons arising from investigations into recent accidents. It contains facts which have been determined up to the time of issue, and is published to provide information about the general circumstances of marine accidents and to draw out the lessons to be learned.

The sole purpose of the Safety Digest is to prevent similar accidents happening again. The content must necessarily be regarded as tentative and subject to alteration or correction if additional evidence becomes available. The articles do not assign fault or blame nor do they determine liability. The lessons often extend beyond the events of the incidents themselves to ensure the maximum value can be achieved.

This Safety Digest is comprised of 23 articles written in the past four years.

Extracts can be published without specific permission, providing the source is duly acknowledged.

The Safety Digest is only available from the Department for Transport, and can be obtained by applying to the MAIB. Other publications are available from the MAIB.

Marine Accident Investigation Branch

The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) is an independent part of the Department for Transport. The Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents is responsible to the Secretary of State for Transport.

The role of the MAIB is to contribute to safety at sea by determining the causes and circumstances of accidents, and working with others to reduce the likelihood of such causes and circumstances recurring in the future.

Extract from The Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2005

The fundamental purpose of investigating an accident under these regulations is to determine its circumstances and the cause with the aim of improving the safety of life at sea and the avoidance of accidents in the future. It is not the purpose to apportion liability, nor, except so far as is necessary to achieve the fundamental purpose, to apportion blame.

If you wish to report an accident or incident please call our 24 hour reporting line on 023 8023 2527.

The telephone number for general use is 023 8039 5500.

The Branch fax number is 023 8023 2459. The e.mail address is maib@dft.gsi.gov.uk

Safety Digests are also available on the Internet: www.maib.gov.uk

Index

Chief Inspector’s Foreword 5

Sailing vessels

Case 1 The Tragic Consequences of Not Wearing a Lifejacket 8

Case 2 Poor Decision-Making Leads to the Death of a Skipper 10

Case 3 Knockdown and Total Loss off the Portuguese Coast 12

Case 4 Catamaran Capsize in Solent 13

Case 5 The Sailing “Taster” that Left a Bitter Taste 14

Case 6 Winter Storm in Biscay Claims Life 17

Case 7 Anything But Plain Sailing! 20

Case 8 How Safe is Your Safety Boat? 22

Case 9 To Sail or Not to Sail? 24

Case 10 Dangers of Rotating Machinery 27

Case 11 A Cheap but Priceless Early Warning 29

Case 12 Double Tragedy 31

Case 13 Steering Seizure 33

Power vessels

Case 14 Fishing for Disaster 37

Case 15 Alcohol Ends a Weekend Pleasure Trip 39

Case 16 Early Warning Headaches 42

Case 17 Don’t Underestimate the Familiar 43

Case 18 Kill Cords Save Lives, When Used Properly 45

Case 19 Ouch! One Very Badly Cracked RIB 48

Case 20 Perilous Propellers 51

Case 21 Lookout – Above and Below the Water 52

Case 22 Relaxing Canal Trip Ends in Tragedy 53

Case 23 Fatal Injuries From Propeller 55

List of leisure craft accident reports published since 2004 56

7404-DfT-MAIB Leisure Craft Safety Digest-Text 12/2/08 11:07 Page 5

Chief Inspector’s Foreword

For those who have not read one, the MAIB produces thrice yearly a Safety Digest, containing anonymised accounts of accidents and incidents at sea, together with the lessons that seafarers should learn from each case. Believing in the principle that it is better to learn from others’ mistakes than finding out the hard way for oneself, the MAIB is not in the business of blame or litigation, but is purely interested in future safety.

This Safety Digest is a compendium of 23 cases of leisure craft accidents culled from our regular Safety Digests of the past four years. It is offered to all who enjoy boating of any size or shape, at sea or on inland waters. I urge you to read through both the sailing and the power sections – there are lessons for all of us in both sections.

With this number of cases, it would be simplistic for me to try to stress any lesson as more or less important than any other. What I would ask is that in preparation for each trip you give a thought to safety. “Risk Assessment” has got a bad press, so let us think about risk awareness! A quick mental check of the risks – and how you would avoid them – would make everyone’s life safer: How do I ensure no one falls overboard – and how will we deal with it if someone does? What is the weather forecast and are we equipped for both the forecast weather and any unexpected squalls? What will we do in the case of mechanical breakdown? How will we raise the alarm if required – who will raise the alarm for us if we can’t? What are the navigational hazards – and how will we ensure we miss them? None of this is difficult, but it is important. And please always brief your crew so that they know what to do in an emergency, particularly if you become incapacitated.

Take safety seriously and be safe on the water.

Stephen Meyer Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents

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Sailing vessels SAFETY DIGEST 2003

ic C on sequences Th e Tr ag o f No t W earin g a Lifejacket Narrative

A sailing club was holding its regular summer raising and lowering the asymmetric spinnaker. Wednesday evening race for the keelboat The race then began and the sportsboat, with the members of its club. That evening, a force 5–6 asymmetric spinnaker flying, crossed the starting was anticipated outside the harbour breakwater. line on a starboard tack (sails on the port side). After a short discussion with the race officer to Sometime later, the crew successfully gybed the decide on a particular course, the yacht crews sportsboat on to a port tack (sails on the prepared their boats to race. Seven boats took starboard side) and set course to pass the end of part in the race, the majority of which were the breakwater into the open sea. The sailing was cruiser/racers. exhilarating and everyone on board was enjoying themselves. One of the racers was a distinctly different type of boat. This was an 8m sportsboat, equipped with Just as the sportsboat cleared the end of the an asymmetric spinnaker on a retractable bowsprit breakwater, the retractable bowsprit pole snapped which enabled it to plane at speeds over 20 at the point where it passed through the hull. The knots. The boat did not have an inboard engine boat slowed down and the crew lowered the fitted but, as required by class rules, did have a spinnaker and retrieved the broken bowsprit over small outboard which was stored inside the hull the open transom on the starboard side. The near the mast. helmsman asked if everyone was content to continue racing under the main and jib only, to The sportsboat had a crew of six on the evening which they all agreed. The helmsman then tried to of the accident. Earlier in the year, the sportsboat gybe to head for the first racing mark, but could had been bought jointly by five of the crew on not as the boat was moving too slowly. All of the board. The helmsman was a very experienced and crew apart from the helmsman were on the accomplished sailor who had sailed a variety of starboard side of boat clearing the spinnaker. different craft over many years. The rest of the After attempting to gybe on two occasions co-owners had only crewed sailing boats without success, the boat suddenly did gybe and occasionally prior to buying the sportsboat. The heeled heavily to port. As a result, the helmsman sixth member of the crew had been invited along fell overboard from his position on the port by the helmsman. He was an experienced racing quarter. crew, but this was his first time on the sportsboat. All of the crew were wearing sailing waterproofs. The crew noticed the helmsman in the water, just Two of the crew were wearing no personal as he shouted to them to turn the boat around. buoyancy: the helmsman, who had chosen not to The guest crewman took the helm, but was wear a lifejacket, and a crewman who had left his unable to manoeuvre the boat as it had turned lifejacket in his car. bow into wind and was caught ‘in irons’. The crew shouted to another yacht that was racing to Prior to the race, the crew on the sportsboat raise the alarm. That yacht then started his completed some practice manoeuvres, including inboard engine and, leaving his sails to flog, made

towards the man in the water. The skipper on this wearing no personal buoyancy – jumped in when vessel also called the coastguard, and the inshore he realised he couldn’t hold on. He tried to hold lifeboat was requested. Unfortunately, the on to a line trailing behind the boat, but had to rescuing yacht missed the man in the water on its let go. The swimming crewman arrived at about first pass. the same time, and took the casualty from the crewman with no personal buoyancy to allow him Meanwhile, on board the sportsboat, another to swim to the now nearby rescuing yacht and crewman had taken the helm to try and steer the climb out of the water. The rescuing yacht then boat towards the casualty, while two crew managed to come alongside the casualty and members stood on the foredeck looking for him. crew in the water but, with a freeboard of 0.9m, While steering, the helmsman also tried to unlock the crew on board the yacht only managed to his VHF hand-held radio in order to change hold the unconscious casualty vertically, half out channels to channel 16, but with only one hand of the water with the aid of a rope. free was unable to do so. The lifeboat arrived soon afterwards, the casualty The man in the water was spotted floating face- was taken on board and first-aid administered – down 10–12m away. One of the crewmen on the some 10 minutes after the casualty had fallen in foredeck, who was wearing a buoyancy aid, dived the water. The sportsboat crew, meanwhile, had in and started swimming towards the casualty. fitted their outboard on to the stern bracket, but The sportsboat then started to make some the engine would not start. progress towards the casualty and passed the swimming crewman. As it approached the man in The casualty was winched aboard a rescue the water, two of the crew grabbed hold of him, helicopter and taken to hospital, where he was but were unable to hold him because the boat pronounced dead. was still moving. One of the crewmen – who was

The Lessons

1 The sportsboat had a low 2 The man who fell in the the crew were not readily able freeboard and sea conditions water was the only experienced to use it. All your crew should were moderate to rough, so the helmsman on board the be familiar with using the VHF chances of someone falling sportsboat. No man overboard radio, sufficient to raise the overboard were significant. As drills (MOB) had been carried alarm in an emergency. this was a keelboat race, there out since buying the vessel and was no rescue boat. Personal none of the crew knew what to 4 In this case, no first-aid buoyancy was, therefore, do in the event of someone resuscitation could be carried important to ensure anyone falling in. Ensure that at least out on the casualty until he was falling into the water stayed two members of your crew can in the lifeboat because neither afloat. In this case two men carry out an MOB recovery of the boats involved in the risked their own lives in an effectively. rescue had an effective means attempt to rescue a man who of recovering an unconscious was not wearing a lifejacket. 3 Although not a contributing person from the water. factor to this accident, there was Don’t be selfish, wear your some difficulty using the radio Think about how you might get lifejacket! that was on board the an unconscious person back on sportsboat. The crewman at the board your boat. It could mean helm trying to retrieve the MOB the difference between life and owned the radio, and the rest of death.

-Making ecision Poor D the Death of a Lead s to Skipper Narrative

An 11.2m yacht, drawing 1.5m was being professionally delivered from south-eastern Spain to the East Coast of the UK. There was a crew of three, including the skipper who had a Yachtmaster Offshore qualification with a commercial endorsement.

The voyage took longer than planned due to persistent, often light, headwinds and poor performance under power. They were unable to motor at more than about 3 knots. Folding prop with entangled rope They began the final leg of their journey in poor visibility, having had a tiring voyage up-Channel. All three were awake in the early hours of the underclothes and go over the side with a line tied morning, one on the helm, another keeping a around his waist, attached to the starboard lookout, and a third monitoring the radar. They quarter. This was with the intention of finding were crossing a major river estuary on the East deeper water and laying a kedge anchor with Coast, notorious for shallows and shifting banks, which they might winch themselves off. and were doing so on a falling tide. There was no wind, the sea was smooth, and with the tide in Later, when in the water, the skipper was their favour they were making about 4 knots over speaking to the crew who was on the helm, and the ground. had instructed him to leave the engine running astern. Suddenly the line that was round his waist The skipper was navigating using a chart with a became caught around the propeller and shaft. scale of 1:250,000, and a small portable GPS The skipper was dragged underneath the yacht, chartplotter temporarily fixed just forward of the where he was trapped below the water with the wheel. They were following a route on the line tight around him. chartplotter to a waypoint several miles distant that would take them into very shallow water. The other crew, who had been working with the They ran aground with about 11⁄2 hours of tide anchor, quickly went over the side, carrying a still to fall, which would have amounted to about knife. He dived underneath, but found it very 60cm. difficult to free the skipper. Despite the crew himself becoming very tired in the water, on the Attempts were made to refloat using the engine, fourth attempt he managed to free the skipper and by heeling the yacht by putting the boom to and bring him to the surface. He was able to be port and adding weight to the end. When this brought back into the cockpit but, despite failed, the skipper elected to strip to his attempts at resuscitation, he showed no sign of

life. It is probable that he had been underwater After the yacht had been lifted out of the water, for 10 minutes. to remove the rope that had been around the skipper, a further line was found tangled in the A “Mayday” call had been put out as soon as the folding propeller that was preventing it from skipper became trapped and, in due course, two properly deploying. The line showed signs of lifeboats and a helicopter arrived. The skipper was having been there some time, and was probably flown to hospital where it was confirmed that he the cause of their reduced speed under engine had died. The two surviving crew were taken power. aboard one lifeboat while the other took the yacht in tow.

The Lessons

1 The danger of being in the 4 Fatigue was an important qualifications without having water, attached to a rope, close factor. The skipper had intended practical experience of shallow to a turning propeller cannot be to carry out the voyage with estuaries and shifting banks. overestimated. To reduce the four people on board, but had There are different challenges hazard, the engine should have decided to go with three when presented by the variety of types been disengaged. Better still, it one dropped out. Although it is of waters found throughout the should have been switched off not unusual for a yacht to be world, but if they are unfamiliar altogether while someone was navigated shorthanded over to you, as skipper, extra care over the side. long distances, proper rest is must be taken at the passage essential. It seems very likely planning stage. 2 Thorough passage planning that the skipper’s decision- is important at all times; in making was affected by fatigue. N.B. shallow tidal waters it is The portable GPS/chartplotter essential. The track of the yacht 5 Whenever any type of vessel being used on board this yacht and the waypoints being used grounds, it is vital to carry out a was found to have an unusual were stored in the quick but rational risk characteristic within its chart GPS/chartplotter, and were assessment. The action taken display. As with most units of analysed by the MAIB. The route will be