Topic

Static Electricity

Accumulated electrical charge and discharge as a safety hazard.

Search and Filter This Topic25 documents from 6 publishers

Documents

  • 2023

    Standards for offshore helicopter landing areas (Version 9.1, 7 January 2026; publisher status Current)

    CAAGuidanceCAP437

    Sets criteria for offshore helicopter landing areas on installations and vessels, alongside wind-turbine winching arrangements. Covers structural loading, obstacle protection, surface friction testing, lighting, motion monitoring, meteorological reporting, rescue and fire-fighting, fuel-system design and maintenance, and passenger preparation. The January 2026 amendment introduces arrangements for temporary safety-critical equipment unserviceability.

  • 2022Aug

    What’s an Acceptable LEL Detector Reading? — Process Safety Beacon, August 2022

    CCPSDigestProcess Safety Beacon August 2022

    This bulletin examines a fatal tank explosion during emptying by vacuum truck, where work continued after a reading of 67% of the lower explosive limit. It explains vapour accumulation and sludge hazards, emphasising calibrated gas testing, compliance with testing limits, bonding and grounding, and recognised tank-cleaning practices.

  • 202013 May

    Preventing Static Discharge

    BSEESafety AlertBSEE Safety Alert 384

    This alert describes static discharge contributing to offshore flash fires involving injuries and facility damage. It explains bonding and grounding, connection quality and the limitations of plastic containers. Recommendations address metal buckets, slow liquid discharge, grounded storage tanks, worker training and adherence to written procedures.

  • 20205 May

    Ignited hand sanitiser

    IMCASafety FlashIMCA SF 15/20

    This safety flash describes burns to a man’s hands after he touched a surface before alcohol-based sanitiser had dried. It attributes ignition of the fumes to static electricity, producing almost invisible flames. He extinguished them at a sink. The account highlights the sanitiser’s flammability and failure to identify all energy sources.

  • 2020Mar

    March, 2020 - Vacuum Trucks can Catch Fire and Explode! — Process Safety Beacon, March 2020

    CCPSDigestProcess Safety Beacon March 2020

    This bulletin describes a vacuum truck explosion at a Californian wastewater facility involving incompatible substances, followed by fires and evacuations. It explains flammable vapour and static electricity hazards during vacuum collection, and highlights permit completion, material compatibility checks, grounding and bonding, and separation of vent discharge from ignition sources.

  • 201421 Jan

    Internal Explosion Ruptures Crown Mounted Compensator Piping

    IADCSafety AlertIADC Alert 14-01

    An alert describes ignition during pressure equalisation between composite air pressure vessels on a crown mounted compensator. Adiabatic compression heat or air-transfer static was identified as the ignition source. Rising pressure and temperature ruptured connecting pipework, leaving two employees with non-life-threatening injuries requiring shore-based treatment.

  • 201220 Nov

    Electrostatic Charge Results in Methanol Tank Explosion

    IADCSafety AlertIADC Alert 12-29

    This alert describes an explosion and flash fire involving a polyethylene methanol storage tank, attributed in its title to electrostatic charge. A worker checking the fluid level touched the inner tank cap; surrounding flammable vapour ignited. He received first aid for a second-degree arm burn.

  • 201025 Aug

    Xcel Energy Company Hydroelectric Tunnel Fire

    CSBInvestigation Report

    Investigates the fatal Cabin Creek penstock fire during epoxy sprayer cleaning with methyl ethyl ketone. Static discharge was the most likely ignition source. The report examines confined-space monitoring, contractor selection, training and rescue arrangements, with recommendations on solvent substitution, ignition prevention and escape, supported by comparative incident research.

  • 2009Jan

    Fire while filling portable container! — Process Safety Beacon, January 2009

    CCPSDigestProcess Safety Beacon January 2009

    This bulletin revisits a fire during ethyl acetate filling into a portable steel tote. It explains how free-falling liquid can generate static charge and recommends bottom filling or dip pipes, with initially restricted velocity. Further measures include bonding, earthing and hoses designed for flammable liquids.

  • 2008Dec

    Static Electric Discharge Causes Fire — Process Safety Beacon, December 2008

    CCPSDigestProcess Safety Beacon December 2008

    Describes a fire during ethyl acetate filling at a chemical distribution facility. Isolated metal nozzle components likely accumulated static charge and sparked to the tote, igniting vapour. Explains bonding and grounding, regular ground-connection checks and minimising liquid free fall when filling containers with flammable liquids.

  • 2008Sep

    Barton Solvents Flammable Liquid Explosion and Fire — Case Study

    CSBInvestigation Report

    This case study examines a fire and explosions during ethyl acetate filling at Barton Solvents in Des Moines. Static discharge from unbonded metal components likely ignited vapour near a portable tank opening. It analyses nozzle and hose suitability, bonding and grounding, dip-pipe filling, and inadequate fire separation and suppression.

  • 2007Dec

    Oil Tank Fire Caused by Static Discharge — Process Safety Beacon, December 2007

    CCPSDigestProcess Safety Beacon December 2007

    A floating-roof tank exploded and burned during diesel filling after previously containing petrol. The bulletin describes NTSB findings linking unsafe filling and content-change procedures to static ignition in a flammable vapour space. It highlights operating procedures, change review and filling-velocity limits until the fill pipe is sufficiently submerged.

  • 20062 Mar

    Safety Alert 239 - Casing Bleed-down into Plastic Drum Results in Fire on Platform

    BSEESafety AlertBSEE Safety Alert 239

    An offshore platform fire began during casing-fluid bleed-down into a plastic drum. Investigators identified static electricity as a possible ignition source. The alert contrasts the drum with required grounded metal containers, describes fire-system failures and containment, and recommends reviewing relevant policies and stressing strict adherence.

  • 2003Sep

    BLSR Operating Ltd. Vapor Cloud Fire — Final Investigation Report

    CSBInvestigation Report

    This investigation examines a fatal vapour-cloud deflagration during oilfield waste unloading near Rosharon, Texas. It analyses waste flammability, tank withdrawal methods and diesel-engine ignition, identifying backfire as the most likely ignition source. Recommendations address hazard information, closed-piping transfer, grounding, training and overspeed emergency procedures.

  • 20037 Mar

    Decanting Synthetic Based Mud Can Results in a Flash Fire

    IADCSafety AlertIADC Alert 03-10

    This alert highlights fire and explosion hazards when decanting low-flash-point synthetic-based mud additives. It describes delivery in tote tanks and gravity feeding through flexible hoses into mud pits, identifies a flammable-liquid classification, and links explosion potential to absent bonding or grounding. It also directs readers to check additive safety data for flammability.

  • 19986 May

    Potential for Fire: Air Compressors

    IADCSafety AlertIADC Alert 98-07

    An alert describes a fire and explosion in a semi-submersible MODU’s machinery space. A static spark from a screw-type air compressor’s separator element initiated an internal fire. Burning discharge-line seals allowed the line to separate, releasing an oil/air mixture whose oil spray subsequently ignited.

  • Undated

    Diesel Generator Flash Fire During Unattended Manual Refuelling

    BSEEInvestigation Report

    An investigation examines a diesel generator flash fire during unattended manual refuelling on 16 January 2010. Static discharge was identified as the most likely ignition source. The report records missing hazard reviews and grounding, immediate extinguishment without injury, and subsequent measures addressing shutdown, cooling, grounding, continuous attendance and firefighting training.

  • Undated

    Instrument Panel Flash Fire During Well Production Start-Up

    BSEEInvestigation Report

    An investigation describes a flash fire during well production start-up after a hydraulic pump failed to stop. A metal wrench contacting the pump sparked and ignited gas inside the instrument panel. The worker sustained minor facial burns and extinguished the fire. Findings identify uncleared gas accumulations and uncontrolled sparks.

  • Undated

    Flash Fire During Casing-Pressure Diagnostics

    BSEEInvestigation Report

    An investigation describes a flash fire during casing-pressure diagnostics while well fluids were bled into a plastic drum. Static electricity was considered the probable ignition source. The report records absent procedures and job safety analysis, impaired firefighting systems, and an existing requirement for grounded metal sampling containers.

  • Undated

    Compressor-Skid Fire Following Condensate Drainage During Restart Attempt

    BSEEInvestigation Report

    Investigation of a compressor-skid fire on the Marco Polo TLP following condensate drainage during a restart attempt. The report identifies an unattended bypass valve and possible static ignition. Fire spread to CLX cable trays, where reignition limited water suppression; foam and BC suppressants eventually subdued it. The narrative and form header give different incident dates.

  • Undated

    Platform Fire During Wireline Solvent Treatment and Chemical Flowback

    BSEEInvestigation Report

    Investigation of a platform fire during wireline solvent treatment and chemical flowback into an open-top tank. A consultant suffered burns and personnel evacuated. Findings examine uncontrolled well flow, inadequate grounding, unavailable safety valves and deficient work planning; a forensic assessment attributed ignition to static discharge near the gas buster or tank.

  • Undated

    Gas-Compressor Fire on Offshore Production Platform

    BSEEInvestigation Report

    Investigation of a gas-compressor fire on the South Timbalier 28 PRD offshore platform. Inspectors identified cooler-tube rupture and gas release as the most likely cause, with static charge the probable ignition source. Pressure and tube age may have contributed through fatigue. A fusible plug triggered process shutdown; operators immediately extinguished the fire.

  • Undated

    Gas Fire Following Sales-Gas Pressure and Back-Pressure Valve Problems

    BSEEInvestigation Report

    Investigation of a gas fire at HI 22-B following problems with sales-gas pressure and a back-pressure valve. Supply-line separation was potentially linked to high pressure or hurricane damage; static electricity was a possible ignition source. The report recommends studying pressurised stainless-steel tubing under mechanical stress.

  • Undated

    Barton Solvents Explosions and Fire — Case Study

    CSBInvestigation Report

    This case study examines the Barton Solvents tank explosion and fire in Kansas during naphtha transfer. It analyses static accumulation, a likely spark at a loose float linkage, and shortcomings in chemical hazard communication. Additional precautions discussed include inerting, float modification, conductivity-enhancing additives and reduced pumping velocities beyond normal bonding and earthing.

  • Undated

    Sierra Chemical Co. High Explosives Accident — Sierra Chemical Co. Final Report

    CSBInvestigation Report

    Investigates two explosions at Sierra Chemical’s Nevada explosives plant that killed four workers and injured six. The report favours mixer startup against solidified explosives but retains alternative initiating scenarios. Physical, seismic and metallurgical analyses support the reconstruction, while findings address deficient hazard analysis, procedures, training, change management and building separation.